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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 A gunman murdered Darrell Cooley in a bar in Erie, 
Pennsylvania, in December 1994. Nearly four years later, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania indicted and tried Vance 
Haskell for Cooley’s murder. The primary issue at the trial was 
whether Haskell was the gunman. In addition to circumstantial 
evidence linking Haskell to the murder, the Commonwealth 
presented four eyewitnesses. But one of these eyewitnesses 
recanted his pre-trial testimony implicating Haskell and two 
had previously denied that they would be able to identify the 
shooter. The fourth eyewitness, Antoinette Blue, did provide 
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consistent testimony claiming she could identify the shooter. 
What’s more, she claimed to expect nothing in return from the 
Commonwealth in exchange for her testimony. But this last 
claim was untrue. Both Blue and the prosecutor knew that she 
expected to receive help in her own pending criminal matters 
in exchange for her testimony. The prosecutor failed to correct 
Blue’s statement; he even went on to rely on it and vouch for 
Blue in his closing argument.  
Haskell filed a habeas petition challenging his 
conviction as tainted by perjured testimony in violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. We must decide 
whether Haskell is entitled to relief once he has shown a 
reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 
154 (1972) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)), 
or whether he must also show Blue’s perjured testimony 
caused him “actual prejudice” under the standard in Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993). We hold that 
Brecht does not apply when the State has knowingly presented 
or failed to correct perjured testimony. In those circumstances 
a petitioner carries his burden when he makes the reasonable 
likelihood showing required by Giglio and Napue. Because 
Haskell has done so here, we grant his petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 In the early hours on December 10, 1994, a man entered 
a bar called Jethroe’s Steakhouse in Erie, Pennsylvania with a 
semiautomatic weapon (described at trial as an “Uzi”) and 
opened fire. He shot roughly 14 times, killing Darrell Cooley 
and wounding Kevin Twillie. The shooter fled the scene with 
another man, Curtis Mathis. 
 Mathis was convicted in November 1995 for his role in 
these crimes (two counts of hindering apprehension of the 
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shooter). He did not identify the shooter and received three to 
seven years in prison. 
 A year into his sentence, Mathis, hoping that his 
cooperation would result in parole, communicated with 
Detective Sergeant James Skindell to cooperate in the ongoing 
investigation to identify the shooter. He provided a videotaped 
statement in which he named Vance Haskell (whom Mathis 
also called “Hakeem”) as the shooter. Haskell was charged 
with Cooley’s murder, aggravated assault of Twillie, unlawful 
carrying of a firearm, and several related crimes in November 
1997. His trial began ten months later. 
 As noted, the primary issue at trial was the identity of 
the shooter. The Commonwealth’s prosecutor, Matthew R. 
Hayes, presented testimony from over 40 witnesses; only 
four—Mathis, Roseanna Wayne, Dorothea Roberts, and 
Blue—ever claimed to be able to identify Haskell as the 
shooter, and all except Blue had denied—either at trial or 
before—that they could do so. 
 A. Trial Testimony 
 Haskell is from Rochester, New York, but the 
Commonwealth presented evidence that he was in Erie, 
Pennsylvania around the time of the murder. Felicia Clark 
testified that Haskell and Mathis had been staying at her Erie 
apartment in Franklin Terrace in the weeks leading up to the 
shooting. The two drove from Rochester to Erie with Clark’s 
brother, and evidence suggests that he drove Haskell away 
from Erie between December 9th and 11th: Clark’s uncle 
testified at trial that he had loaned his car to her brother on 
December 9, 1994; when he got it back two days later, it had 
been driven 586 miles, and police later matched to Haskell 
fingerprints on beer bottles left in the car. 
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 Nine witnesses testified that the unknown shooter was 
wearing a puffy coat; although two of them recalled the coat 
being blue or black in color, the other seven described it as 
green. Eight witnesses testified that Mathis and an unidentified 
shooter were in Jethroe’s together and fled after the shooting. 
One man who was in the parking lot during the shooting 
testified that he saw Mathis and Haskell running toward the 
alley behind Jethroe’s. He noted that Haskell was wearing a 
“big fluffy jacket.” Also, three witnesses testified that Mathis 
and someone else took a cab to Franklin Terrace. One of them 
was the cab driver, although his only recollection was of 
picking up two black men from Red’s Tavern, which is not far 
from Jethroe’s. A resident of Franklin Terrace picked Haskell 
out of a photo line-up and said he had been at her home after 
the shooting. 
 Two witnesses testified they previously saw Haskell 
with a gun similar to the firearm recovered in an alley near 
Jethroe’s. One said that he had seen Haskell several times at 
Felicia Clark’s home with “a nine-millimeter pistol, 380 
automatic, an Uzi, like, type machine gun.” J.A. 745. He also 
identified the recovered Uzi as the gun he saw Haskell 
carrying. The other testified that she had seen Haskell with a 
black firearm “slightly bigger than your average handgun” four 
days before the shooting and that he was wearing a green down 
coat at that time. Id. at 683. 
 In sum, these witnesses placed Haskell in Erie near 
Jethroe’s around the time of the shooting and put two key items 
associated with the shooter in his possession: a large gun and a 
green, fluffy jacket. But none of them saw Haskell shoot the 
victims. 
 Four individuals presented eyewitness testimony of the 
shooting. But each witness’s testimony came with a few 
problems for the prosecution. 
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 The first, Mathis, who had put the Commonwealth on 
Haskell’s trail and had already been convicted of assisting the 
shooter’s escape, recanted his previous statements on the stand. 
In Mathis’s videotaped statement, he said that he and Haskell 
went to Jethroe’s together that night and, while he did not 
witness the shooting occur, he saw Haskell immediately after 
wearing a green “puffy” coat and holding a smoking gun. 
Mathis also stated that he fled the bar with Haskell, that Haskell 
threw the gun under a vehicle in an alley and tossed off his 
coat, and that they went to another nearby bar. From there they 
got into a cab to head toward Franklin Terrace. In the video 
Mathis was shown a photo line-up and identified Haskell. 
 But at trial Mathis recanted his videotaped statement 
and testified instead that he was at Jethroe’s at the time of the 
shooting but was not there with Haskell. He claimed he did not 
witness anyone with a gun; he left the bar in a car he drove 
himself and went to a place known as the “Holly” rather than 
the Franklin Terrace housing project.1 Mathis agreed that, 
when he gave the videotaped statement, his “only concern 
[was] getting out of jail[.]” Id. at 629. He related that he 
reviewed police reports of the murder (of which he had copies 
from his own involvement in the case) in order to tell the police 
and prosecutors what they wanted to hear—that is, what would 
make their case against Haskell. 
                                              
1 The Commonwealth presented a great deal of testimony to 
rehabilitate Mathis’s videotaped testimony. Among the more 
important details of his initial story corroborated by other 
witnesses were that Mathis and the shooter left the bar together, 
that a gun recovered from under an old truck left for many 
years in the alley near Jethroe’s resembled the gun used by the 
shooter, and that Mathis and another man went to the home of 
Felicia Clark’s neighbor in Franklin Terrace after the shooting. 
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 Second, Roseanna Wayne only stated that Haskell’s 
appearance was not inconsistent with that of the shooter. Id. at 
348 (“If the hair was down lower, the beard was off the face, 
the mustache was off the face . . . [,] [i]t look [sic] like the 
shooter.”). But earlier in her testimony she said she was not 
sure she could identify the shooter. Id. (“Q. If you saw that 
person again, the person that was doing the shooting, do you 
think you’d recognize that person? A. No. I don’t know.”). At 
other moments in her testimony, Wayne appeared to be more 
confident, id. at 357 (“Sir, he look just like the man.”), but she 
also admitted on cross-examination that she had never seen 
Haskell before the day she testified in court, id. at 357 (“Q. 
Never seen Mr. Haskell before today? A. No, sir.”).  
 The third eyewitness, Dorothea Roberts, testified in 
court that she was at Jethroe’s on the night of the shooting and 
that she saw the shooter. She further testified that Haskell was 
the shooter and identified him in court. However, about three 
months after the shooting, Roberts had told Detective Skindell 
that she did not see the shooter. On cross-examination, Roberts 
denied this and said that if Detective Skindell wrote that in his 
report, he must have lied. Roberts also testified that she was 
currently in the Erie County Jail on charges of simple assault. 
Id. at 483. 
 With three eyewitnesses who each made questionable 
identifications of Haskell, Prosecutor Hayes called Antoinette 
Blue to the stand. She testified that she saw Haskell shoot 
Cooley and had met Haskell before the shooting took place, 
strengthening the power of her identification. As context, Blue 
stated that she had seen Haskell around town for a few weeks, 
and, 20 minutes before the shooting, she smoked marijuana 
with him, Mathis, Felicia’s Clark’s brother, and a woman 
named Yolanda in Jethroe’s parking lot. That night, Blue did 
not report to the police that she was able to identify the shooter. 
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She never spoke with the police about the incident until three 
years later in February of 1998. 
 B. Blue’s Communications with the  
  Commonwealth 
 Blue was in the Erie County Jail when she finally spoke 
to the police about the shooting. Two warrants brought her 
there. One was issued for a parole violation following her 
conviction for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The 
second stemmed from her failure to appear for sentencing after 
pleading guilty to a charge of attempted theft. 
 And Blue had other troubles in Mercer County. She was 
arrested there and charged with receiving stolen property, 
criminal conspiracy, unsworn falsification, three misdemeanor 
counts of retail theft, and four summary counts of retail theft. 
It was following this arrest that police transported her to the 
Erie County Jail because of that County’s two outstanding 
warrants. Back in Erie, she reached out to Detective Skindell 
to cooperate in Haskell’s case. 
 Blue lied when she testified at Haskell’s preliminary 
hearing on March 18, 1998. When asked on cross-examination 
whether she had “any criminal charges pending against [her,]” 
she left out her numerous pending charges in Mercer County 
and responded that she was “just [in jail] on a probation 
violation.” Id. at 79. 
 Blue also testified adamantly that she never discussed 
with anyone whether cooperating with Haskell’s prosecution 
would help her get out of jail and that “it never occurred to 
[her]” that cooperation might be helpful to her. Id. at 109-10. 
But just two days after testifying at the preliminary hearing, 
Blue received sentences on her parole violations that (despite 
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having picked up additional charges in Mercer County) 
resulted in her release from custody. 
 Within weeks of the preliminary hearing, Detective 
Skindell informed Mercer County authorities that Blue was a 
cooperating witness in Erie County’s case against Haskell. 
Skindell also told Blue’s Mercer County defense attorney 
about her cooperation, and the attorney responded by sending 
a strongly worded letter to the Mercer County DA demanding 
a favorable outcome on Blue’s pending charges due to her 
cooperation in the Haskell case. Finally, the prosecutor in 
Haskell’s case, Hayes, reached out to the Mercer DA, who 
informed Hayes that the judge in Blue’s case would be told of 
her cooperation at sentencing.2 
 In September 1998, Blue testified at Haskell’s trial. On 
cross-examination, Haskell’s attorney pointed out that Blue 
was released from jail after she testified at Haskell’s 
                                              
2 I am aware that Ms. Blue faces a misdemeanor 
 retail theft charge in Mercer County. I spoke with 
 the prosecutor in that case and he explained he 
 had already arrived at a Plea Agreement in her 
 case. . . . I also explained that Ms. Blue was 
 assisting in this prosecution. He indicated to me 
 that this assistance would not alter his approach 
 to his prosecution. He indicated he would make 
 the assistance known at the time of her 
 sentencing in Mercer County. . . . The only 
 understanding I am aware of is for Ms. Blue’s 
 cooperation. We would make the sentencing 
 Judge aware of this cooperation. 
 
J.A. 1720 (Letter From Hayes to Haskell’s Defense Counsel 
dated April 30, 1998). 
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preliminary hearing. But Blue denied that the Erie County 
judge was aware of her cooperation and said that the timing of 
her release was “just a coincidence.” Id. at 522. She also denied 
that she cooperated with the police in exchange for help with 
her criminal matters. When asked on what charges she was in 
jail at the time she communicated with Detective Skindell, 
Blue again mentioned only her probation violation and said 
nothing about her charges in Mercer County. 
 Haskell’s attorney then asked several questions aimed 
at revealing Blue’s motivation to cooperate. 
Q. And did you contact the District Attorney’s 
Office because you wanted some help to get out 
of jail? 
A. Get out for what? I wasn’t facing a lot of time, 
what did I need help for? 
Q. So you didn’t – this never came into your 
mind that you wanted to get help to get out of 
jail? 
A. No. Get out for what? 
Id. at 517. 
 On re-direct, Prosecutor Hayes attempted to dispel the 
notion that Blue had agreed to cooperate in order to receive 
some benefit in her own criminal matters. 
Q. . . . Have you been promised anything by us 
to come in here and explain what you just 
explained? 
A. No. 
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Q. Do you anticipate receiving any consideration 
for it? 
A. Do I what? 
Q. Do you expect to get something out of 
testifying? 
A. No, sir. 
Id. at 521. 
 On re-cross, Blue again insisted that she would receive 
no benefit for testifying. 
Q. You didn’t ask anybody to take [your 
testimony] into consideration? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You don’t think anybody was aware of that? 
A. No, sir. 
Id. at 522. 
 In his closing argument, Prosecutor Hayes ridiculed the 
idea that Blue would benefit from her testimony and vouched 
for her credibility: 
Antoinette says that she sees Haskell over at the 
[sic] Felicia Clark’s place. She also sees him out 
in the parking lot, and here she is the one that is 
trying to get all this benefit from this—this 
valuable testimony. And what she says she’s 
doing out there, she’s committing a crime. She’s 
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smoking marijuana. That should help her pretty 
well. 
Id. 1033-34. 
So, yes, she gives her statement [three] years 
later; yes, it’s during the time she’s in prison. Is 
it a lie? Of course not. It’s not a lie. . . . She’s not 
a liar, at least not about what happened here. 
And, if she’s not a liar and if her information is 
good, here’s your man. 
Id. 1036. 
 Just over a month after Haskell’s trial, Blue pled guilty 
in her Mercer County case to one count of retail theft and 
unsworn falsification. Before sentencing, Hayes sent the Court 
of Common Pleas of Mercer County a letter in which he 
explained that Blue gave “very important” testimony at 
Haskell’s trial. Id. at 19. 
 The Mercer County DA recommended a probationary 
sentence. Blue received a suspended sentence of one to four 
years in prison with 18 months of probation for the theft charge 
and a sentence of costs only on the unsworn falsification 
charge. 
 C. Procedural History 
 At trial Haskell was convicted of first-degree murder, 
unlawful carrying of a firearm, possessing an instrument of 
crime, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment. He was 
sentenced to life imprisonment plus a 15–30 month period of 
incarceration consecutive to his life sentence. 
 Haskell pursued his claim that Blue’s testimony 
violated his right to due process in Pennsylvania’s Post 
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Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) Court, which held that his 
perjured-testimony challenge was time barred. But once 
Haskell filed his habeas petition with the District Court under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Commonwealth expressly stated in its 
Answer that this claim was not procedurally defaulted and that 
the District Court must review it on the merits. Accordingly, it 
considered the merits, and because the PCRA Court had not 
reached them, it reviewed the claim de novo. On appeal, the 
Commonwealth makes no objection to the District Court’s on-
the-merits review of Haskell’s perjured-testimony claim. 
 The District Court held that Blue’s testimony was false 
and that the prosecutor knew or should have known it was. 
However, it denied Haskell’s request for relief because he 
failed to show that Blue’s perjured testimony had a substantial 
and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict, which 
the Court believed he was required to demonstrate pursuant to 
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 627. Haskell requested, and we granted, a 
certificate of appealability. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction to 
consider Haskell’s petition under 28 U.S.C § 2254, and we 
have jurisdiction to hear his appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 
2253. “Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing and, instead, based its decision on its review of the 
state court record, we apply a plenary standard of review of its 
decision and order.” Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 226, 232 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (citing Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d 
Cir. 2001)). 
14 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 A. The Reasonable Likelihood Standard 
 A state violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process guarantee when it knowingly presents or fails to 
correct false testimony in a criminal proceeding. See Napue, 
360 U.S. at 269; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153; see also Lambert v. 
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). Consequently, 
“the [Supreme] Court has consistently held that a conviction 
obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is 
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 103 (1976), holding modified by United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
 “[T]he same result obtains when the State, although not 
soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 
269); see also Lambert, 387 F.3d at 242. A conviction must be 
set aside even if the false testimony goes only to a witness’s 
credibility rather than the defendant’s guilt. Napue, 360 U.S. at 
270. 
 The standard of review applicable to perjured testimony 
claims is “strict.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. This is so “not just 
because [those claims] involve prosecutorial misconduct, but 
more importantly because they involve a corruption of the 
truth-seeking function of the trial process.” Id. 
 Accordingly, in order to establish his claim, Haskell 
must show that (1) Blue committed perjury, (2) the 
Commonwealth knew or should have known that the testimony 
was false, (3) the false testimony was not corrected, and (4) 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony 
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could have affected the judgment of the jury. Lambert, 387 
F.3d at 242. 
 Uncontested facts in the record demonstrate that 
Haskell has satisfied the first three elements. Blue lied when 
she testified—both at Haskell’s preliminary hearing and at his 
trial—that she expected nothing in return for her testimony. 
She expected and eventually received favorable treatment at 
sentencing for her Mercer County charges. The 
Commonwealth, of course, knew Blue’s testimony was false 
and failed to correct it. Turning to the final inquiry, we 
conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Blue’s false 
testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Blue was a 
key witness. All the other eyewitnesses had significant 
problems with their testimony. Mathis recanted on the witness 
stand and claimed that Haskell was not the shooter. Wayne and 
Roberts had both previously said that they would not be able 
to identify the shooter. Thus Blue, who claimed to have met 
Haskell before the shooting, provided strong evidence that 
Haskell was the shooter. As the Commonwealth put it in its 
closing argument at Haskell’s trial, “this [is] valuable 
testimony.” J.A. 1034. And the Commonwealth’s decision to 
vouch for Blue’s credibility only emphasizes her importance. 
Id. at 1036 (“It’s not a lie. . . . She’s not a liar, at least not about 
what happened here. And, if she’s not a liar and if her 
information is good, here’s your man.”). 
 Given her central role, knowledge of the benefit she 
received in exchange for her testimony—substantial help with 
her own pending criminal charges—poses a reasonable, and 
significant, likelihood of affecting the judgment of the jury. See 
Napue, 360 U.S. at 270 (“Had the jury been apprised of the true 
facts . . . it might well have concluded that [the witness] had 
fabricated testimony in order to curry the favor of the very 
representative of the State who was prosecuting the case in 
which [he] was testifying, for [he] might have believed that 
16 
 
such a representative was in a position to implement (as he 
ultimately attempted to do) any promise of consideration.”). 
 Moreover, the facts of this case are in line with those in 
Napue and Giglio, the cases in which the Supreme Court 
initially articulated when false testimony requires relief. In 
Napue, as in Haskell’s trial, a key witness falsely testified “that 
he had been promised no consideration for his testimony, and 
[] the Assistant State’s Attorney handling the case had known 
this to be false.” Napue, 360 U.S. at 267. And much like our 
case, Napue concerned the identification of assailants in a bar-
room murder that the key witness was in a unique position to 
provide. Id. at 264 (“[The key witness’s] testimony was 
extremely important because the passage of time and the dim 
light in the cocktail lounge made eyewitness identification very 
difficult and uncertain, and because some pertinent witnesses 
had left the state.”). Finally, the benefit for which the Napue 
witness had bargained was the same as Blue’s: “a 
recommendation for a reduction of his . . . sentence [in his own 
criminal matter] would be made and, if possible effectuated.” 
Id. at 266. 
 Giglio also involved a witness’s false statement that he 
had been promised nothing in return for his testimony. 405 
U.S. at 152. The witness there was promised immunity from 
prosecution by a government attorney but denied it on the 
stand. Id. And, like our case, the prosecution returned to and 
emphasized the false testimony in its summation of the case. 
Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that “whether the 
nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the 
responsibility of the prosecutor.” Id. at 154. Recognizing the 
importance of this key witness’s testimony, the Court found 
that his “credibility . . . was therefore an important issue in the 
case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a 
future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the 
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jury was entitled to know of it.” Id. at 154-55. Because this fact 
was kept from the jury, due process required a new trial. 
 Thus there is little doubt Haskell has met the standard 
set by Napue and Giglio. 
 B. Brecht 
 Meeting this standard, however, does not end our 
inquiry. Although the Supreme Court has held that the 
Giglio/Napue “materiality” standard discussed above is 
equivalent to the harmless-error standard articulated in 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring the 
beneficiary—the prosecution—of a constitutional error to 
demonstrate that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), 
see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680 n.93, the Commonwealth contends 
                                              
3 [It is a] well-established rule that a conviction 
 obtained by the knowing use of perjured 
 testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be 
 set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that 
 the false testimony could have affected the 
 judgment of the jury. Although this rule is stated 
 in terms that treat the knowing use of perjured 
 testimony as error subject to harmless-error 
 review, it may as easily be stated as a materiality 
 standard under which the fact that testimony is 
 perjured is considered material unless failure to 
 disclose it would be harmless beyond a 
 reasonable doubt. The Court in Agurs justified 
 this standard of materiality on the ground that the 
 knowing use of perjured testimony involves 
 prosecutorial misconduct, and more importantly, 
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that Haskell must also meet the separate actual-prejudice 
standard of Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. It held that when 
constitutional trial errors are raised in habeas proceedings, as 
opposed to on direct review, the petitioner is generally entitled 
to relief only if he can show “actual prejudice.” Id. at 631. This 
occurs when the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting 
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). “[I]f a 
judge has ‘grave doubt’ about whether an error affected a jury 
in this way, the judge must treat the error as if it did so.” O’Neal 
v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 438 (1995) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 Brecht relied on three characteristics of habeas 
proceedings to ground the distinction between harmless error 
under Chapman applicable on direct review (putting the 
burden on the prosecution) and the heightened prejudice 
requirement it was announcing for habeas (that is, collateral) 
review (burdening the convicted petitioner seeking relief). 
First, “the State[] [has] [an] interest in the finality of 
convictions that have survived direct review within the state 
court system[,]” which review under Chapman’s harmless-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard would undermine. 
Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635. Second, values of comity and 
federalism favor the Brecht standard because “[f]ederal 
intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States’ 
sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith 
attempts to honor constitutional rights.” Id. (citing Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)). Third, “liberal allowance of 
                                              
 involves a corruption of the truth-seeking 
 function of the trial process. 
  
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678–80 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
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the writ degrades the prominence of the trial itself, and at the 
same time encourages habeas petitioners to relitigate their 
claims on collateral review[.]” Id. (internal citations, quotation 
marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted). 
 But these concerns do not apply to all constitutional 
errors, and thus, there are a number of exceptions to Brecht’s 
actual-prejudice requirement. The Court recognized in Brecht 
itself that structural constitutional errors, like denial of the right 
to counsel, are not subject to harmless-error review. Id. at 630. 
Moreover, it noted that, “in an unusual case, a deliberate and 
especially egregious error of the trial type, or one that is 
combined with a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, might so 
infect the integrity of the proceeding as to warrant the grant of 
habeas relief, even if it did not substantially influence the 
jury’s verdict.” Id. at 638 n.9. 
 The Court identified another exception in Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995), when it held that Brecht’s 
standard does not apply when the state has violated Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing evidence 
favorable to the defendant. The Court explained that it “had 
previously rejected [substantial and injurious effect] as the 
standard governing constitutional disclosure claims[.]” Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 436 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112). Once a 
petitioner demonstrates “‘a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different,’” the inquiry is over, 
and a petitioner meeting Brecht’s substantial-and-injurious-
effect (or actual-prejudice) standard is unnecessary. Id. at 435 
(quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). 
 Like the suppression of evidence, presentation of 
perjured testimony also violates Brady. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 
103 (describing three situations to which Brady applies: (1) the 
government’s knowing presentation of or failure to correct 
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false testimony; (2) its failure to provide requested exculpatory 
evidence; and (3) its failure to volunteer exculpatory evidence 
never requested). Cf. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679 n.8 (“In fact, the 
Brady rule has its roots in a series of cases dealing with 
convictions based on the prosecution’s knowing use of 
perjured testimony.”). However, the Court in Kyles, a habeas 
case, explicitly declined to consider whether Brecht applies to 
collateral review of convictions tied to knowing use of perjured 
testimony. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 n.7 (“[W]e do not consider 
the question whether Kyles’s conviction was obtained by the 
knowing use of perjured testimony and our decision today does 
not address [Brecht’s applicability to] any claim under the first 
Agurs category.”). 
  Our Court also has not resolved whether Brecht applies 
to cases like the one before us. In a case preceding Kyles, we 
held that the Brecht standard does indeed apply to habeas 
petitions alleging a prosecutor’s knowing use of perjured 
testimony. Robinson v. Arvonio, 27 F.3d 877, 885 (3d Cir. 
1994), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 513 U.S. 1186 (1995). 
But the Supreme Court vacated our judgment in Robinson and 
remanded the case for further consideration in light of O’Neal, 
513 U.S. at 438, which clarified the Brecht standard as 
requiring relief when “a judge has grave doubt about whether 
an error” “had substantial and injurious effect or influence 
upon the jury[.]” We, in turn, remanded the case back to the 
District Court and did not hear a subsequent appeal. See Order, 
Robinson v. Arvonio, et al., Case No. 92-5667 (Oct. 10, 1995). 
Because an order of the Supreme Court “vacating the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals deprives that court’s opinion of 
precedential effect[,]” County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 
U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979) (quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563, 577–78 n.12 (1975)), we have explicitly 
recognized that Robinson is no longer binding precedent. 
Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 960 n.30 (3d Cir. 1998). 
21 
 
 Thereafter we have discussed (without mention of 
Brecht) the proper standard to apply to habeas petitions 
involving perjured-testimony claims. In Lambert, 387 F.3d at 
242, we noted that when “the prosecution’s case includes 
perjured testimony and the prosecution knew, or should have 
known, of the perjury . . . [or] when the government, although 
not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when 
it appears at trial[,] . . . the conviction must be set aside if there 
is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the judgment of the jury.” We went on to quote 
Bagley’s statement that 
although this rule is stated in terms that treat the 
knowing use of perjured testimony as error 
subject to harmless error review, it may as easily 
be stated as a materiality standard under which 
the fact that testimony is perjured is considered 
material unless failure to disclose it would be 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Lambert, 387 F.3d at 242 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 679). 
The implication is that, for perjured-testimony claims raised in 
habeas proceedings, the materiality and harmless-error 
standards are one and the same. Accordingly, Brecht’s 
standard would not apply. But, as noted, Lambert made no 
reference to Brecht. Perhaps this was because it concluded that 
the statements cited were not perjured. See id. at 243, 245, 252 
& 266. In any event, Lambert does not resolve by a holding 
whether habeas petitioners must meet Brecht’s actual-
prejudice hurdle. 
 Our sister Circuits are split on the question. Relying on 
Kyles, the Ninth Circuit has rejected application of Brecht to 
perjured-testimony cases. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 
(9th Cir. 2005) (“Even though this case comes to us on habeas 
review, we do not conduct an additional harmless error 
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analysis under Brecht[.]’”). Analogizing to claims brought 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “federal courts do not conduct a 
separate Brecht analysis in ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.” Id. at 985. Whenever the applicable test is “derived 
from the Agurs materiality standard” (e.g., claims involving 
suppression of evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, or 
perjured testimony), Brecht does not apply. Id. (“When the 
Supreme Court has declared a materiality standard, as it has for 
this type of constitutional error, there is no need to conduct a 
separate harmless error analysis.”). 
 The First, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
disagreed, applying Brecht to habeas petitions raising perjured 
testimony claims. See Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 268 
(1st Cir. 1995); Rosencrantz v. Lafler, 568 F.3d 577, 587-90 
(6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Clay, 720 F.3d 1021, 1026-27 
(8th Cir. 2013); Trepal v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 684 
F.3d 1088, 1111–13 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 The First Circuit, which issued its decision prior to the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Hayes, reasoned that “[a]pplying th[e] 
[reasonable-likelihood] standard in most cases involving 
perjury or its equivalent will likely result in a finding of 
constitutional error.” Gilday, 59 F.3d at 268. “Scaling that 
lower materiality hurdle, however, still will leave the petitioner 
facing the Brecht harmless error inquiry into whether the 
perjured testimony in fact had a substantial and injurious effect 
or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Id. Brecht does not apply to 
evidentiary-withholding claims, by contrast, because those 
claims already require “a court to find an impact on the jury 
verdict sufficiently substantial to satisfy the Brecht harmless 
error test.” Id. 
 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the First and rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s intervening opinion, asserting that the Hayes 
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Court “erred in failing to distinguish false-testimony claims 
from Brady withholding claims.” Rosencrantz, 568 F.3d at 
590. The Eleventh Circuit followed suit three years later. 
Trepal, 684 F.3d at 1113 (holding Brecht applied because “the 
more lenient Giglio materiality standard leaves room for the 
possibility that perjured testimony may be material under 
Giglio but still be harmless under Brecht”).  
 Four years after Rosencrantz, the Eighth Circuit joined 
the majority, applying Brecht because “the materiality standard 
for false testimony is lower, more favorable to the defendant, 
and hostile to the prosecution as compared to the standard for 
a general Brady withholding violation.” Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 We favor—and therefore adopt—the Ninth Circuit’s 
approach. As that Court recognized, Kyles suggests that for the 
three types of due-process violations discussed in Agurs there 
is no need to perform a separate harmless-error analysis under 
Brecht. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 985 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436). 
This is because for these violations the materiality and 
harmless-error standards merge. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678–
80. That is, the test for materiality supplies the test for 
harmlessness and there is no need to look to Brecht to supply a 
harmless-error standard. Hayes, 399 F.3d at 985. 
 More importantly, the concerns behind Brecht do not 
reach claims of perjured testimony presented by the state. To 
repeat, the Supreme Court’s imposition of Brecht’s harmless 
error standard was motivated by three concerns: (1) “the State[] 
[has] [an] interest in the finality of convictions that have 
survived direct review within the state court system”; (2) 
“[f]ederal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the 
States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-
faith attempts to honor constitutional rights”; and (3) “liberal 
allowance of the writ degrades the prominence of the trial 
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itself, and at the same time encourages habeas petitioners to 
relitigate their claims on collateral review[.]” Brecht, 507 U.S. 
at 635 (internal citations, quotation marks, brackets, and 
ellipses omitted). These are weighty interests no doubt, but 
they do not reach the facts before us. 
 The Supreme Court has long counseled that “a 
deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of 
testimony known to be perjured . . . is [] inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of justice[.]” Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103, 112 (1935). Put differently, “[it is a] well-established 
rule that a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured 
testimony is fundamentally unfair[.]” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678–
79. In Brecht itself the Court recognized “the writ of habeas 
corpus has historically been regarded as an extraordinary 
remedy, a bulwark against convictions that violate 
fundamental fairness.” 507 U.S. at 633 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Thus it is difficult to see how concerns of 
finality would trump rudimentary demands of justice and 
fundamental fairness when those are precisely the values the 
writ of habeas corpus is intended to protect. 
 Second, when the state knowingly presents perjured 
testimony, we are not presented with a “good-faith attempt[] to 
honor constitutional rights,” Id. at 635, but instead with a bad-
faith effort to deprive the defendant of his right to due process 
and obtain a conviction through deceit. After all, courts apply 
Napue’s “strict standard of materiality” to perjured-testimony 
cases “not just because they involve prosecutorial misconduct, 
but more importantly because they involve a corruption of the 
truth-seeking function of the trial process” by the state itself. 
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104. 
 Third, there is little chance that excluding perjured 
testimony claims from Brecht analysis will “degrade[] the 
prominence of the trial itself[.]” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635. 
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A defendant will usually be unable to litigate his claims of 
perjured testimony at “the trial itself” because the trial is where 
the perjury occurs. And it is possible, even likely, that 
petitioners will not know of the prosecution’s use of perjured 
testimony until after the opportunity for direct review has 
passed. 
 Finally, the First and Sixth Circuits note that, without 
Brecht review, perjured testimony faces a lower bar than 
suppression claims. Gilday, 59 F.3d at 268; Clay, 720 F.3d at 
1026. But to us that seems to be a feature, not a bug. If 
suppression of evidence (and thereby, the truth) is a serious 
constitutional error, its fabrication is a greater error still. That 
is why the Supreme Court set out differing materiality 
standards for the three types of error that implicate Brady: (1) 
the government’s knowing presentation of or failure to correct 
false testimony, (2) its failure to provide requested exculpatory 
evidence, and (3) its failure to volunteer exculpatory evidence 
never requested. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-06. Presenting 
false testimony cuts to the core of a defendant’s right to due 
process. It thus makes sense that “the materiality standard for 
false testimony is lower, more favorable to the defendant, and 
hostile to the prosecution as compared to the standard for a 
general Brady withholding violation.” Clay, 720 F.3d at 1026. 
 At root is how can a defendant possibly enjoy his right 
to a fair trial when the state is willing to present (or fails to 
correct) lies told by its own witness and then vouches for and 
relies on that witness’s supposed honesty in its closing? As the 
Supreme Court recited in Napue, 
[i]t is of no consequence that the falsehood bore 
upon the witness’ credibility rather than directly 
upon defendant’s guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter 
what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant 
to the case, the district attorney has the 
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responsibility and duty to correct what he knows 
to be false and elicit the truth. 
360 U.S. at 269–70 (quoting People v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 
853, 854-55 (N.Y. 1956)) (internal ellipses omitted). 
 For these reasons, we hold that the actual-prejudice 
standard of Brecht does not apply to claims on habeas that the 
state has knowingly presented or knowingly failed to correct 
perjured testimony. A reasonable likelihood that the perjured 
testimony affected the judgment of the jury is all that is 
required. 
* * * * * 
 Haskell has demonstrated that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that Blue’s false testimony could have affected the 
judgment of the jury. Hence he is entitled to relief. He need not 
go on to show that this error had a substantial and injurious 
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict because, 
when the state has corrupted the truth-seeking function of the 
trial by knowingly presenting or failing to correct perjured 
testimony, the threat to a defendant’s right to due process is at 
its apex and the state’s interests are at their nadir. Accordingly, 
we grant Haskell’s habeas petition and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
